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Abstract 
Existing works on diffusion fail to account for the incapacitating effects conflict events may 
have on the operational capability of the combatant sides and how these effects may determine 
the evolution a conflict. I hypothesize that it is those events with losses on the state side that 
are likely to be associated with geo-temporal spillovers whereas events with insurgency losses 
are less likely to be associated with future mayhem in their vicinity.  To test my arguments, I 
first introduce a new, comprehensive and detailed event dataset on the long-running civil 
conflict in Turkey. The Turkey-PKK Conflict Event Database (TPCONED) includes the exact 
date and county level location for the fatal events of the armed conflict between the Turkish 
state and the rebel organization PKK since its very beginning in 1984 with detailed information 
on combatant casualties.  I then employ a split population biprobit model which allows me to 
comprehensively depict the geotemporal evolution of the conflict by acknowledging, 
estimating and accounting for the variation in the underlying conflict proneness across locations 
as a latent variable that shapes the diffusion of events. The results of the statistical analyses 
offer support for my hypotheses and reveal that how events evolve over space and time is 
conditioned by the damages suffered by the combatant sides. I demonstrate the robustness of 
these results on a matched sample I obtain by employing the Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM) 
on the data. 
 




How do civil conflicts evolve over time and space? Are they chaotic episodes of armed 
violence in fragile states or is there a predictable pattern to the diffusion of events that we can 
decipher? Given the prevalence and destructiveness of civil conflicts it is imperative that we 
answers these questions, because if we can figure out the spatial and temporal dynamics, we 
can then hope to devise pre-emptive actions and policies to prevent or at least contain these 
humanitarian disasters.  
The literature on conflict diffusion is dominated by works on international contagion and 
focuses on the factors that facilitate the spread of civil conflicts between countries (Ward & 
Gleditsch, 2010; Buhaug & Gleditsch, 2008; Cederman, Girardin & Gleditsch, 2009; Cederman 
et al., 2013; Lake & Rothchild, 1998; Lane, 2016; Salehyan & Gleditsch, 2007; Weidmann, 
2015). Compared to this rich literature on cross-country diffusion, the literature on diffusion of 
events within conflicts is still in its early stages. Nevertheless, existing studies have already 
firmly established that conflict events exhibit spatial and temporal interdependencies 
(Townsley, Johnson & Ratcliffe, 2008; Hegre, Ostby, & Raleigh, 2009; Lyall, 2009; Raleigh et 
al., 2010; Weidmann & Ward, 2010; Schutte & Weidmann, 2011; O’Loughlin & Witmer, 
2012). This strong result has then led scholars to explore the mechanisms that explain this 
spatio-temporal clustering of violence. Recent works have theorized about and provided 
empirical evidence for the role played by the relative capabilities of combatants (Holtermann, 
2016; Beardsley, Gleditsch & Lo, 2015), accessibility of locations via road networks (Zhukov, 
2012), environmental conditions (Carter & Veale, 2015), and retaliatory motives (Braithwaite 
& Johnson, 2012; Linke, Witmer & O’Loughin, 2012) in determining the time and location of 
conflict events.  Surprisingly however, none of these works pays any attention to the 
incapacitating effects these events may have on the warring factions and how these effects may 
determine the evolution of the conflict. Even those studies that emphasize the tit-for-tat nature 
of conflicts seem to have forgotten what Machiavelli reminded Lorenzo Di Pierro De Medici 
400 years ago: ‘(men) can avenge themselves of lighter injuries, of more serious ones they 
cannot’ (p.7). 
In this study, I argue that how an insurgency spreads within a country is associated with 
how conflict events affect the operational capabilities of the warring sides, or in Machiavelli’s 
words, with the amount of injury each side suffers as a result of each event. Employing a split 
population bi-probit model I test my arguments on a new event dataset I introduce on the long 
running civil conflict in Turkey. The results offer support for my arguments. Confirming 
previous diffusion studies, I find that once a civil conflict starts geotemporal interdependencies 
play an important role in determining how events evolve over time and space.  Significantly 
contributing to our understanding of these interdependencies, and in line with my theoretical 
arguments, my findings indicate that the geotemporal evolution of the conflict is conditioned 
by the damages suffered by the combatant sides, and that it is events with losses on the state 
side that are likely to be associated with geotemporal spillovers, whereas events with 
insurgency losses are less likely to be followed by further violence in the neighborhood.  
In the next section, I discuss diffusion patterns in civil conflicts and introduce my 
theoretical arguments. Then I introduce my case, my data, my statistical model, the results and 
robustness checks in the following sections.  
Theory and Literature 
The conflict diffusion literature has two main branches. The first branch focuses on 
international diffusion and analyzes the mechanisms behind transnational spillovers of 
violence. The works under this branch are in fact cross-country studies of conflict onset that 
assess a country’s risk of experiencing a civil conflict based on its local characteristics and its 
interactions with the outside world. Among the interactions identified in this literature as 
transborder carriers of conflict risk are refugee flows (Salehyan & Gleditsch, 2007; Braithwaite, 
2010; Rüegger, 2018), communication networks (Weidman, 2015; Beiser, 2016), circulation of 
arms and combatants (Lane, 2016; Bara, 2018; Braithwaite & Chu, 2018), learning and strategic 
emulation (Buhaug & Gleditsch, 2008; Maves & Braithwaite, 2013; Hill, Rothchild & 
Cameron, 1998; Forsberg, 2008; Ayres & Saideman, 2000), and external sponsorship of 
insurgencies (Gleditsch, Salehyan, & Schultz, 2008; Cederman, Girardin & Gleditsch, 2009; 
Schultz, 2010). 
The findings of this impressive literature provides theoretical and methodological insights 
for the second branch which takes a micro-level approach to analyze the within-conflict 
diffusion of violence. This literature is still in its early stages; however, existing works have 
already firmly established that conflict events exhibit a strong spatial and temporal 
interdependency (Townsley, Johnson & Ratcliffe, 2008; Hegre, Ostby & Raleigh, 2009; Lyall, 
2009; Raleigh et al., 2010; Weidmann & Ward, 2010; Schutte & Weidmann, 2011; O’Loughlin 
& Witmer, 2012). Recent works have investigated the mechanisms that explain this spatio-
temporal clustering and provided empirical evidence for the role played by factors such as the 
accessibility of locations via road networks (Zhukov, 2012), environmental conditions (Carter 
& Veale, 2015), internal displacements (Bohnet, Cottier & Hug, 2018), and state coercion 
(Duffy Toft & Zhukov, 2012) in determining the time and location of conflict events.  
Interestingly however, attention is yet to be paid to the incapacitating effects conflict events 
may have on the warring sides, and how these effects may influence the likelihood of 
geotemporal spillovers. This, I argue, is a serious shortcoming. Civil conflicts involve strategic 
actors making strategic decisions on whether, when and how to act. It is, thus, not possible to 
construct an accurate understanding of how conflict events evolve over time and space without 
taking into account those factors that shape these decisions. Operational capability is one of the 
most important of such factors. Operational capability refers to the capacity of conflict actors 
to carry out successful combat operations against the adversary on the battlefield, and is mainly 
determined by resources available to them and their ability to successfully use those resources 
(Tellis et al., 2000). Note that conflict events can inflict damages on both of those determinants 
of operational capability and as such can have incapacitating effects on conflict actors.  
The argument that the evolution of a conflict is associated with how conflict actors are 
affected by events has in fact already been raised by those works that emphasize the tit-for-tat 
nature of conflicts and the retaliatory motives of conflict actors (Jaeger & Paserman, 2008; 
Lyall, 2009; Haushofer, Biletzki & Kanwisher, 2010; Linke, Witmer & O’Loughlin, 2010; 
Kocher, Pepinsky & Kalyvas, 2011; O’Loughlin & Witmer, 2012; Braithwaite & Johnson, 
2012; Schutte & Donnay, 2014). However, even those works implicitly assume that combatants 
will always have the capacity to react against all instances of violence. In this study, I relax this 
assumption by controlling for combatant casualties in each violent event as a measure of the 
damage to the operational capability of warring sides.  
The size of the military force is an important resource in all armed conflicts, but especially 
so for insurgents fighting against powerful state adversaries. In fact, the opportunity cost 
theories of conflict onset posit the availability of labor as the binding constraint on the 
production of violence by insurgencies (Grossman, 1991; Mikulascheck & Shapiro, 2018). 
Most civil conflicts are fought between organized, well-armed, and sizable state military forces 
and relatively much smaller and ill-equipped insurgent groups1. Balcells & Kalyvas (2014) use 
the term ‘irregular conflicts’ (p.1391) to refer to civil conflicts with such power asymmetry.  
The asymmetry in resources in irregular civil conflicts means that, compared to state forces, 
casualties are expected to be more costly and debilitating for insurgents since each combatant 
corresponds to a higher share of their operational capability. The relative difficulty of recruiting 
and training replacements inflates this cost further. Heavy losses against state forces may also 
                                                        
1 According to the Technologies of Rebellion dataset, during the Cold War period, 66.34% of all major civil 
conflicts were  asymmetric (Kalyvas & Balcells, 2010).   
have a deterrent effect on both the insurgents and their civilian support base which may then 
render recruitment even more difficult and may even lead to defections.   
The asymmetry in resources not only renders them more valuable for insurgents but also 
shapes the way they utilize them. Due to state’s material advantages, insurgent groups stand a 
high risk of defeat if they try to fight the state with conventional tactics in consistent theaters 
of combat. They thus favor mobility and guerilla warfare. Staying mobile helps them evade 
attacks. It also gives them an opportunity to compete with the state’s armed forces by varying 
targets and using the element of surprise to their advantage (Beardsley, Gleditsch & Lo, 2015). 
McColl’s (1969) influential account of how revolutionary insurgencies evolve emphasizes the 
need for mobility as well.  
Note that this type of irregular warfare creates a pattern in which insurgents proactively 
stage hit-and-run attacks which then drive state forces into reactive counterinsurgency 
operations2. But, the insurgents’ capacity to sustain such a pattern depends on whether they can 
hit their targets and run afterwards without getting hit themselves. Casualty counts give us a 
grim account of their success in doing so. While security force casualties provide a measure of 
the hit the state side takes, insurgency casualties provide a measure of their (in)ability to run. It 
follows that with each insurgent casualty this pattern becomes less sustainable, and the 
likelihood of future hit and run attacks in the vicinity goes down. On the other hand, state 
casualties can be expected to bolster this pattern. It is reasonable to expect  damages on state 
forces to make it easier for insurgents to escape after an attack. Successful attacks may also 
boost morale among rebels, help them in their efforts to gain public support and find new 
recruits (Kalyvas, 2006) thereby allowing them to increase the geotemporal scope of their 
activities.  
Casualties are important in determining the actions of state forces as well.  The size 
advantage and the relative ease of recruitment shield the operational capability of state forces 
against losing soldiers, thus state casualties are less likely to have a dampening effect on conflict 
activity. On the contrary, in many cases, losses on the state side carry heavy political costs for 
state leaders (Kibris, 2011), and lead them to resort to retaliatory actions that perpetuate 
violence (Jaeger & Paserman, 2008).  Holtermann (2016) argues that state casualties can also 
be seen as a measure of the relative capacity of rebels and as such they can indicate higher 
likelihood of future conflict events in the neighborhood. Relatedly, losses in one area may lead 
                                                        
2 Confirming this pattern, Linke, Witmer & O’Loughlin (2012) indicate that most attacks around Baghdad in the 
2004-2009 period were initiated by insurgents (p.6). 
to a transfer of state military resources from nearby locations and may leave those areas 
vulnerable.  
If these are valid mechanisms then we should expect events with insurgency casualties to 
curb the potential for future events in nearby locations and events with state security force 
casualties to be harbingers of geotemporal spillovers. The next two hypotheses are derived from 
these expectations: 
Hypothesis 1: In irregular civil conflicts, casualties on the state side are positively associated 
with future conflict events in other locations in the neighborhood. 
Hypothesis 2: In irregular civil conflicts, casualties on the insurgency side are negatively 
associated with future events in other locations in the neighborhood. 
I test these hypotheses on a new and detailed event dataset I introduce on the long running 
civil conflict in Turkey. The Turkey-PKK Conflict Event Database (TPCONED) includes the 
exact date and county level location for the fatal events of the armed conflict between the 
Turkish state and the rebel organization PKK in the 1984-2018 period with detailed information 
on combatant casualties.  
Statistical analysis of conflict diffusion offers an empirical challenge because it comes with 
very specific and demanding data requirements. In order to be able to track the geotemporal 
path of violence, one needs a comprehensive and complete event dataset with detailed 
information on the time, location and characteristics of conflict events. Comprehensiveness, 
which is full geotemporal coverage of the conflict, is important to make sure that any observed 
association is not specific to a period or a location. Completeness, which is not having any 
missing observations, is even more important. Missing observations introduce a serious 
selection bias in any statistical analysis, but they are even more problematic in diffusion studies 
since with each missing observation another step in the geotemporal progression of events gets 
lost and the accuracy of the data set in reflecting the diffusion of violence weakens. TPCONED 
is a comprehensive and complete event data set on the armed conflict between the rebel 
organization PKK and the Turkish state, and as such, it avails the armed conflict in Turkey as 
a rich case study for understanding the geotemporal dynamics of civil conflicts. 
The conflict 
Since late 1984, Turkey has been suffering from an insurgency campaign led by the 
Kurdish separatist guerrilla organization the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). The organization 
was first founded with the goal of establishing an independent Kurdish state in south-eastern 
Turkey, though later on in the 1990s, it appeared to have rolled back on its goal to a federational 
structure that would grant more autonomy to the large Kurdish minority in the country. The 
armed conflict between the PKK and the Turkish security forces (TSF) has been geographically 
concentrated in south-eastern and eastern regions which have traditionally been inhabited by 
ethnic Kurds. First dismissed by Turkish governments as the acts of a handful of outlaws, this 
irregular conflict has been going on for more than 35 years3. Financially, it has cost the country 
billions of dollars. But more importantly, it claimed the lives of tens of thousands. 
 
Figure 1 depicts the total number of  TSF and PKK casualties over time. As can be seen,  
the 90s has been the bloodiest period of the conflict. The insurgency announced a unilateral 
ceasefire after its leader Abdullah Öcalan was captured in 1999, and ceased its attacks in the 
early 2000s. Unfortunately, peace in the area did not last long and violence flared up again after 
2004. The latest ceasefire was announced in March 2013 as part of a peace process which 
unfortunately broke down in July 2015 only to bring more bloodshed. Figure 2 depicts the 
geographical distribution of combatant casualties at the province level and reveals their 
geographical concentration. 
  
                                                        
3 The Turkish prime minister of the time referred to the PKK as a handful of outlaws after their first  attacks in 
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Figure 2. Total combatant casualties, 1984- 2018 
Figure 1. Combatant casualties, 1984 - 2018 
The Turkey-PKK conflict event database - TPCONED 
I test my hypotheses with a new, high-resolution event dataset that I introduce in this study 
on the armed conflict between the rebel organization PKK and the Turkish state. This is one of 
the longest running civil conflicts in the world, and it plays an important role in the political 
turmoil of the Middle East, and as such it has a lot to tell us about civil conflicts. However, due 
to scarcity of reliable data, it has been analyzed by only a handful empirical studies so far.  I 
release the Turkey-PKK Conflict Event Database (TPCONED)  with the hope of motivating 
those much-needed studies that will bring this deadly conflict into the spotlight.  
TPCONED (https://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/138227) is a dataset on the fatal events of the 
armed conflict between the rebel organization PKK and the Turkish state that took place on 
Turkish soil and in which there was at least one combatant casualty. It contains detailed 
information on 7063 conflict events with 17308 PKK casualties and 7514 state casualties over 
the course of the conflict in the 1984-2018 period4. For each event, the exact date, location at 
the county (town) level, location at the province level, number of TSF and PKK casualties, and 
the data sources are listed. The dataset has been in the making since 2009, and relies on a wide 
range of local sources which include reports and publications by the Turkish Ministry of 
Defence, Turkish General Staff, the Directorate General of Press and Information of Turkish 
Prime Ministry and by various other state offices and local administrations in Turkey; the 
archives of the Gendarmerie Museum in Ankara; the digital and hard copy archives of five 
major Turkish daily newspapers (Cumhuriyet, Milliyet, Hürriyet, Sabah, and Zaman); PKK 
publications; daily and yearly reports by the Turkish Human Rights Association; scholarly 
works (Tezcür, 2016); and personal contacts and interviews with the families of the casualties. 
I provide detailed information on these sources in section A1 in the online appendix. 
Note that my sources belong to different political affiliations and views. I cross checked 
contentious events across these sources to make sure that the resulting dataset is as 
comprehensive and accurate as possible. A very important thing to note here is that combatant 
casualties do not only serve as a binary decision rule for an event to be included in TPCONED 
but more importantly they provide a solid confirmation of the validity of each event in the 
dataset.  
Turkey has a draft army and a mandatory military service system that requires each Turkish 
man, when he comes of age, to serve in the army for about a year. This mandatory system is 
supported by a military and religious culture that glorifies the army and service to the country. 
                                                        
4 The dataset is continuously updated. Currently, events of 2020 are being coded. 
When a soldier or a police officer dies in service he or she is considered a martyr, both legally 
and culturally. A state funeral is held for each of them in their hometowns. These funerals have 
always been important public events attended by high-level military and state officials and 
thousands of locals. The national and the local media cover the story of the fallen soldier or 
officer, his grief-stricken family, and the funeral ceremony, and by so extensively publicizing 
the casualties on the state side, they create the most credible way of tracking down the events 
and the geotemporal evolution of the conflict.  
A similar glorification of combatant casualties is also present on the PKK side. They also 
refer to their casualties as martyrs and commemorate them by special publications. Although 
very limited compared to the information on the Turkish side, such resources present valuable 
information on conflict events. 
Hence, all the events recorded in TPCONED have been confirmed by information on the 
identity of the each of the 7514 TSF casualties involved and of a good portion of the PKK 
casualties5.   
To demonstrate the accuracy, precision and comprehensiveness gains that TPCONED 
accomplishes, I present a systematic and detailed comparison (á la Donnay et al., 2018) of 
TPCONED and the UCDP-GED database (Sundberg & Melander, 2013), which is one of the 
most commonly used conflict event databases by researchers, in section A2 in the online 
appendix. Note that the GED does not have any data on the conflict for its first five years, and 
then has only a total of 4682 conflict events recorded for the 1989-2018 period. Moreover, of 
the recorded events, only 54%, have location information at the county level, that is, location 
at the county level is missing in 46% of the observations. With nearly half the observations 
missing, it becomes quite impossible to track the evolution of the conflict at the county level 
with the GED data. Unfortunately, the problem with missing observations persists at larger 
geographical aggregations as well. For 7.5% of the observations, reported location covers 
almost the entire conflict zone6.  
Another major problem that diminishes the quality of existing conflict event databases is 
that most of them rely on international news agencies. Going back to the GED example, nearly 
                                                        
5 No personal information on the casualties is included in TPCONED but anonymized information is available on 
request. 
6 The Global Terrorism Database (GDT) which is also commonly used in conflict studies, includes even fewer 
observations with only 2208 events recorded for the conflict between the Turkish state and the PKK. Moreover, 
the database’s coverage remains very lacking for the 1990’s which, as Figure 1 depicts, is the most intense period 
of the conflict. A more serious shortcoming for my purposes is that the GTD reports fatalities in aggregate without 
any breakdown, thus, it does not allow one to assess the losses of the sides. Finally, data source is missing for 850 
(38.5%) observations and location is coded as unknown for 14% (309) of the recorded events. 
all the observations under the Turkey-PKK conflict are coded from sources like the BBC, 
Reuters, Agence France Press, etc. Admittedly, these international news agencies themselves 
rely on local sources for information, but they tend to rely more on state sources or agencies 
which, in many cases, feed them with biased information. In the Turkish case for example, they 
mostly rely on the Anadolu (News) Agency which is in fact owned and controlled by the 
Turkish state. Moreover, they tend to be biased towards more substantial events in their 
reporting while ignoring smaller ones. They also tend to summarize the information they 
receive from local sources and leave out certain details, like precise location of the event, which 
they deem irrelevant for their international readers. Moreover, in many cases, a lot gets lost in 
translation. 
Statistical model and analyses 
Simply stated, diffusion refers to the temporal and geographical spread of conflict events.  
In this study, I define a conflict event as any conflict related lethal violence that results in the 
death of at least one combatant. I use casualties as a measure of the size of losses in terms of 
operational capability of each warring faction in each conflict event.  
In most civil conflicts, violence remains geographically clustered, and a great deal of places 
never experiences any events while a small subset of locations accounts for nearly all the 
violence in a recurring fashion. Civil conflicts are violent struggles about state formation 
(Weinstein, 2007; Tull, 2004; Pegg, 1998), in other words, insurgencies are would-be states. 
Note that no such would-be-state-maker takes up arms without a targeted territory. Insurgents 
may target to take over a country as a whole or some parts of it, either because it is the ethnic 
homeland, the promised territory, or because it is rich in economic resources, or home to 
ideologically sympathetic populations, etc. The fact that insurgents target certain territories 
implies that there is an underlying, base risk distribution over space, and that the geotemporal 
evolution of the conflict is correlated with this distribution. This implication is consistent with 
the observed geographical clustering of conflict events. It is also consistent with McColl’s 
(1969) account of how insurgencies evolve. The targeted base areas become the hubs of conflict 
events, the areas in their periphery experience relatively fewer incidents as insurgents try to 
expand, and the rest of the territory remains outside the conflict zone. But if particular territorial 
units are not likely to experience any conflict events, then their inclusion in the sample may 
lead the diffusion analysis astray. Braumoeller & Goertz (2002) and Mahoney & Goertz (2004) 
argue that including irrelevant cases where the outcome of interest is impossible induces 
erroneous inference. Having said that trying to exclude them can also be very problematic since 
it requires distinguishing between the relevant and irrelevant areas when relevancy is 
unobservable. Any ad hoc identification risks excluding relevant areas or including irrelevant 
ones. Note that a similar problem had been discussed in the study of international conflicts. 
There the argument is that some country dyads, because they lack any opportunity to fight, are 
not relevant for an empirical study on the determinants of international war. To deal with this 
problem, Clark & Regan (2003) and Xiang (2010) propose split population models in which 
they estimate relevance as a latent variable. In this study, I follow their proposition and employ 
a split population bi-probit model to analyze the geotemporal evolution of conflict events.  
In a split population model an additional binary choice regression—used as a selection 
step—is added to a standard statistical model to capture the idea that there are two data 
generating processes behind the observed data. In the context of modelling civil conflict 
diffusion, the selection step is meant to estimate the underlying risk distribution over territorial 
units and identify the potential base areas. A split population model, in that sense, can be used 
to bring together the civil conflict onset literature which explains the occurrence of violence in 
relation to specific conditions existing prior to the conflict, and the diffusion literature which 
emphasizes the importance of geotemporal interdependencies7.  
My dependent variable Yi,t is a binary incidence variable that takes on the value 1 if a 
conflict event took place in location i in time t, and 0 if not, and 
Yi,t ~ 0 with probability 1 – pi and  
Yi,t ~ Fi,t with probability pi  
where Fi,t is a cumulative distribution function for a binary choice model.  
Let pi = Gi where Gi is also a cumulative distribution function for a binary variable. Then, 
because the zero outcome is generated by both the binary choice models Gi  and Fi,t, we have  
Yi,t = 0 with probability (1 – Gi)+ Gi(1 – Fi,t) and  
Yi,t = 1 with probability GiFi,t 
under the assumption that the two distributions are independent. Here, Gi determines the 
distribution of underlying conflict risk and Fi,t determines the distribution of event risk. Note 
that the underlying risk is not observable. We only observe whether a location experiences a 
conflict event at a given time or not. 
The independence assumption is not a reasonable one in a civil conflict context. Locations 
with high underlying risk will most probably have high probability of experiencing conflict 
events. I therefore adopt a bivariate standard normal distribution to model the two correlated 
cumulative distribution functions. As a result, the above model becomes  
                                                        
7 The identification restrictions are discussed in Section A3 in the online appendix. 
Yi,t = 0 with probability [1 - F2(bXi,t, gZi,t; r )] 
Yi,t = 1 with probability F2(bXi,t, gZi,t; r ) 
where F2 is the bivariate standard normal cumulative distribution function and r is the 
correlation coefficient. Z is the vector of covariates that affect the base risk, and X is the vector 
of covariates that affect the probability of diffusion. This is very similar to the binary choice 
model Xiang (2010) employs in the context of international war.  
The subscripts i and t designate time and space units to be used. In terms of designating 
space, the literature hosts two approaches. The first approach makes use of administrative 
divisions (Holtermann, 2016; Ward & Weidman, 2010; O’Louglin & Witmer, 2012; Zhukov, 
2012) to identify distinct spaces. Scholars justify the distinctiveness of administrative units by 
referring their socioeconomic differences. However, as Schutte & Weidmann (2011) argue 
‘administrative boundaries may have little relevance in civil wars, since they can be crossed 
easily by armed forces’ (p.147). But this concern is even more valid for the second approach 
which divides the area of study into grid cells of equal size and treats each grid cell as a distinct 
space (Schutte & Weidman, 2011; Raleigh & Hegre, 2009; Townsley, Johnson & Ratcliffe, 
2008). Unfortunately, there is not much discussion in the works that employ geographical grids 
on what makes two adjacent grid cells distinct spaces from the perspective of conflict actors 
and/or for the sake of conflict dynamics. To deal with the ad hoc nature of this gridding exercise 
two alternatives have been offered so far. The more commonly adopted alternative is to repeat 
the analyses with multiple grid sizes. While this practice may help ease concerns about the 
robustness of estimated associations, it does not provide any theoretical justification for the 
relevance of resulting geographical units. Moreover, exact event coordinate information is very 
hard to come by. Most conflict event databases, including the GED, report the coordinates of  
the administrative unit in which the event takes place. The second alternative is offered in a 
recent study by Schutte (2017) where he employs a point process model (PPM) in which, rather 
than relying on predefined spatial units, suitable spatial windows are heuristically defined from 
the distribution of events over territory.  As Schutte (2017) argues, these windows offer a better 
alternative to ad hoc spatial grids but are so far limited to cross-sectional analysis as ‘the 
introduction of a temporal dimension provides additional challenges’ (p.454). 
Schutte & Weidman (2011) argue that spatially aggregating conflict activity leads to a loss 
of information, and they favor using as fine a spatial resolutions as possible with the data to 
hand. In this study, I follow up on their advice and estimate my model under the highest spatial 
resolution possible with my data, namely, the county level. This is quite a high resolution 
especially considering that I am able to sustain it across all events throughout the whole span 
of the conflict and that it cannot be attained by any of the other available data sets. Moreover, 
my socioeconomic controls are able to match the geographical resolution of my event data. To 
make sure that my results are not specific to any time aggregation, I estimate my model under 
monthly, quarterly, half-yearly and yearly time denominations.  
My X vector of diffusion covariates contains within conflict dynamics. To control for the  
geotemporal interdependencies, I include the length of the last peace spell; the percentage of 
past periods with conflict incidences; one-period lagged state casualties; one-period lagged 
insurgent casualties; one period lagged inverse-road-distance-weighted state casualties in other 
counties; and one period lagged inverse-road-distance-weighted insurgent casualties in other 
counties. These last two are the control variables of interest for this study as they are the 
spatiotemporal lags whose association with the dependent variable will inform us about the 
extent and nature of geotemporal spillovers.  Unlike existing studies, I do not limit geotemporal 
interdependencies to immediately neighbouring administrative units or units within a fixed 
distance. Instead, my spatio-temporal lags take into account all events of the previous period 
after assigning them weights according to distance. Accordingly, the one period lagged inverse-
road-distance-weighted insurgent casualties for county i at time t is 
Sk¹i (1/dki)(state casualties)k,t-1 
where dki is the road distance between county k and county i in kilometers. Similarly,  
Sk¹i (1/dki)(insurgency casualties)k,t-1 
is the spatio-temporally lagged insurgency casualties for county i at time t8. I use road distances 
to calculate these spatial lags in order to account for the role of the road networks in facilitating 
the spread of violence (Zhukov, 2012). 
I also control for area, border status and percentage of rural mountainous terrain across 
counties. Finally, I include season and year dummies to capture the seasonal and yearly 
variations. 
My Z vector of covariates for base risk includes a rich set of controls which depict the 
socioeconomic situation at the start of the armed conflict. I control for percentage of farmers 
                                                        
8 Simply put, for each county i, these expressions add up the casualties that took place in all other counties in the 
previous period after dividing the casualty count from each county by the road distance between that county and 
county i. This way, casualties elsewhere are weighted according to their distance from county i. Consequently, 
casualties from nearby counties get assigned a higher weight in the calculation of the weighted average, whereas 
casualties that took place in faraway counties are divided by their higher distances and so get assigned much 
smaller weights. 
with no land; percentage of farmers with more than 100 acres of land; number of mosques per 
village; percentage of villages with no drinking water; percentage of villages with no electricity; 
unemployment rate; literacy rate and level of urbanization across counties as measures of state 
capacity and reach, and as indicators of economic development and welfare. Economic 
grievances and low state capacity create fertile environments for insurgencies (Holtermann, 
2012). I also control for the percentage of villages whose names were changed by the state as a 
measure of ethnic discriminatory policies. Ethnic discrimination is identified as an important 
factor that increases the vulnerability of a country to experience conflict (Metternich, Minhas 
& Ward, 2017; Cederman et al., 2013; Cederman, Wimmer & Min, 2010). Relatedly, I also 
control for the ethnic distribution of the population across counties to account for the potential 
support base of the PKK. 
Finally, I control for the percentage of mountainous area; border status and population 
across counties (Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Do & Iyer, 2010; Weidman & Ward, 2010; Zhukov, 
2012; Holtermann, 2016; Cederman, Girardin & Gleditsch, 2009; Cederman et al., 2013).  
I provide a detailed discussion on the control variables in Section A4 in the online appendix 
along with descriptive statistics and a visual representation of their predictive power in terms 
of the base risk of conflict across counties. 
Results 
Table I below presents the estimated parameters of the bivariate probit model under 
monthly, quarterly, half-yearly and yearly time aggregations.  
The estimated coefficients for the within-conflict-dynamics equation reveal the importance 
of geotemporal interdependencies. The longer a county stays peaceful the less likely it becomes 
to experience violence. Similarly, counties with more troubled histories, measured by 
percentage of past times with conflict events and with casualties in the county itself in the 
previous period, are more likely to experience conflict events.  
As hypothesized, results indicate that geotemporal spillovers are conditioned by the losses 
of the sides. The estimated parameters for the inverse-distance-weighted-lagged-casualties 
indicate that it is the state force casualties in an area that are heralds of conflict events in nearby 
locations.  On the other hand, events with insurgent casualties have a significant dampening 
impact on future events in the vicinity especially in the longer runs. These results are consistent 
with the asymmetric power structure in civil conflicts and with a rebel strategy of hit and run 
attacks whose likelihood of spilling over to nearby locations increases as state forces incur more 
military losses and decreases as insurgents themselves get hit.  
TABLE I. Partial observability bivariate probit results 
 
 
Unit of observation: 
County-month 
(1984-2018) 
Number of obs.: 
266845 
Unit of observation: 
County-quarter year 
(1984-2018) 
Number of obs.: 88734 
Unit of observation: 
County-half year 
(1984-2018) 
Number of obs.: 44367 
Unit of observation: 
County-year 
(1984-2018) 
Number of obs.: 
21862 
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Estimated parameters for seasonal and year dummies are not reported.    
Base risk    
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Wald Chi-square 3786.69 3604.00 687.50 269.11 
Correlation (rho) between the two equations 













11.56** 0.47 10.45** 
Standard errors are adjusted for 648 counties. 
z-values in parenthesis. 
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01.  
 
The estimated parameters of the base risk equation point towards the importance of state 
reach and control. Mosques as preachers of state ideology, and big land owners as the agents 
of the state in the rural areas seem to make an important dampening impact on the underlying 
conflict risk.   
As expected, base risk is significantly higher for counties with higher Kurdish population 
percentages. Those locations which had been subject to discriminatory state policies and had 
their names Turkified by the state have a higher likelihood of being part of the conflict area.  
Difficult terrains are not significantly associated with the base risk but they facilitate the 
diffusion of violence in the short run. 
To make sure that these results are not specific to the biprobit model, I replicated the above 
analyses with a simple logit model as well. The estimated associations between the incidence 
probability and the control variables remain similar in direction but get statistically stronger9. I 
present the results in Table A5 in the online appendix.  
Figure 3 plots the average marginal effects of spatio-temporally lagged casualties in order 
to give a better understanding of their relative substantive significance. The marginal effect of 
a variable corresponds to the average expected change in the estimated probability of observing 
a fatal conflict event in county i at time t given a marginal change in that control variable while 
other control variables are evaluated at their mean values. As can be seen, the spatio-temporal 
lag of state casualties has a high marginal effect on the probability of diffusion. The average 
marginal effect of a unit-increase in inverse-distance-weighted state casualties on the 
probability of observing a fatal conflict event at county i in time t ranges from 2.5% to 7.1% 
across different temporal aggregations. On the other hand, the average marginal effect of a unit-
increase in inverse-distance-weighted insurgency casualties ranges from  (-1.3) % to 0.0% 
depending on the time unit10.  
                                                        
9 I also reran the model after controlling for the vote share of the ethnically Kurdish parties across counties in the 
1995, 1999, 2002, 2015 and 2018 general elections. The inclusion of this control either in the base risk or the 
diffusion equation does not create any substantive difference in the results which are available upon request. 
10 I report the estimated average marginal effects for all control variables in Table A4 in the online appendix. 
 
Robustness of Results 
In this section, I employ the Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM) (Blackwell et al., 2009) 
technique as a robustness check on my results.  
Matching is a nonparametric method of controlling for some or all of the confounding 
influence of pretreatment control variables. The key goal of matching is to prune observations 
in order to better approximate experimental conditions in observational data. More specifically, 
a statistical matching criterion based on the similarity of confounding factors or their effect on 
the probability of treatment is used to pair treated and untreated observations, and only those 
matched observations are retained in the dataset while the unmatched ones are discarded. I 
argue that matching is a good robustness check for the results I obtain from the above split 
population biprobit model because it in fact offers another way of defining the relevancy of 
observations based on their similarity in terms of treatment likelihood. Those unmatched 
observation are left out as irrelevant for the purpose at hand. 
The predicted base risk gives me a composite pre-treatment variable subsuming the 
socioeconomic pre-conflict variables across which I can match my observations. Note that 
matching techniques are usually employed on cross-sectional data with binary treatments, 
whereas I have a panel data set and my treatment, i.e. the spatio-temporally lagged casualties, 
is by design a continuous variable. The panel nature of the data is easily incorporated by treating 
groups of observations under each time unit as a separate cross section subset and by conducting 
matching within each of these subsets11. The continuous treatment variable is a more 
challenging obstacle. Matching methods have rarely been applied to a continuous treatment. 
Researchers have proposed techniques to generalize the binary case to continuous treatments 
(Hirano & Imbens, 2004; Bia & Mattei, 2007; Fong, Hazlett & Imai, 2018); nevertheless, these 
                                                        















-.05 0 .05 .1
Effects on the predicted probability of a conflict event
Inverse-distance-weighted state casualties in other counties in t-1
Inverse-distance-weighted PKK casualties in other counties in t-1
Figure 3. Average marginal effects with 95% CIs 
techniques come with some untrivial assumptions (Fong, Hazlett & Imai, 2018) which are not 
suitable for my purposes. 
Instead, I adopt the more common approach in applied social sciences and binarize my 
treatment. My binary treatment variable takes on the value 1 if location i at time t has a high 
inverse-road-distance-weighted average of conflict event incidences in the neighbourhood at 
time t-1 and zero otherwise. Formally, I define my treatment variable as 
Treatmenti,t = 1  if Sk¹i (1/dki)(incidence)k,t-1 > 90th percentile 
Treatmenti,t = 0  otherwise  
where dki is the road distance between locations k and i in kilometers. 
The choice of the cutoff value is based on the distribution of the treatment variable and is 
chosen to distinguish between observations with high and low spatiotemporal incidence lags.  
To make sure that my results do not depend on my choice of cutoff value, I repeated the exercise 
with different cutoff percentiles such as the 75th and the 95th, and obtained substantively similar 
results12. 
I then use the CEM to match my observations. I then run a probit regression with clustered 
errors at the county level on my matched sample. Table II below presents the results13. As can 
be seen, the estimated coefficients still associate events with state force casualties with higher 
risks of future events in the vicinity, while events with insurgency casualties are associated with 
lower risks of mayhem in the neighborhood in the longer runs. 
 
                                                        
12 Results available upon request. 
13 The results are very similar when socioeconomic controls are included (and they are available upon request) but 
please note that in this subsample they are already controlled for by matching.  
TABLE II.  Results of the probit regression on matched sample  
 
Unit of observation: 
County-month 
(1984-2018) 
Number of obs.: 
94206 
Unit of observation: 
County-quarter 
(1984-2018) 
Number of obs.: 
33029 
Unit of observation: 
County-halfyear 
(1984-2018) 
Number of obs.: 
15739 
Unit of observation: 
County-year 
(1984-2018) 
Number of obs.: 
11528 
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Border status  -0.086 -0.091 0.040 0.096†  
 Conclusion 
Kalyvas (2008) applauds the emergence of the literature on micro-dynamics of civil 
conflicts as a very exciting development that deepens our understanding of political violence. 
But he also points out some recurrent flaws in the literature stemming from ‘insufficient 
theorization, superficial engagement with the case at hand and reliance on off-the-shelf 
datasets’ (p.398). My starting point in this study echoes Kalyvas’ criticisms specifically for the 
emerging literature on within-country diffusion of civil conflicts.  
I argue that existing works fail to acknowledge that conflict events can have incapacitating 
effects on warring sides. I tackle this shortcoming by hypothesizing that the geotemporal 
interdependency among conflict events is conditioned by the impact these events have on the 
operational capability of the sides of the conflict. I then test my hypotheses on a new and 
detailed event dataset on the long running civil conflict in Turkey. TPCONED has been in the 
making for more than a decade. It relies on a wide range of local sources from different political 
affiliations and views, and as such offers comprehensive, accurate, high resolution and unbiased 
coverage of the long running civil conflict between the Turkish state and the rebel organization 
PKK. I release TPCONED with the hope that it will be a valuable resource especially for in-
depth studies on micro-level dynamics of civil conflicts.  
One important point to note here is that the hypotheses tested in this study are about the 
diffusion patterns of irregular civil conflicts, and not about their outcomes or their level of 
violence. While the first hypothesis does imply that an irregular civil conflict is likely to 
continue and geographically expand as long as rebels are able to inflict damages on state forces, 
this implication does not allow us to conclude on a rebel victory in such conflicts. In fact, we 
know from cross-country studies that irregular civil conflicts do last long, but, because of the 
power asymmetry that characterizes them, are mostly won by incumbents (Balcells & Kalyvas, 
2014; Kalyvas & Balcells, 2010).  
Similarly, while the second hypothesis does imply that states can curb the geographical 
spread of conflict events by inflicting damages on the insurgents, this implication does not mean 
that states can resolve conflicts by going on a killing rampage. Military coercion, as the 
theoretical arguments and the empirical results here indicate, can be effective in containing or 
even extinguishing violence in the short run, but  it must be remembered that civil conflicts are 
(-0.94) (-0.91) (0.68) (1.74) 
Estimated parameters for seasonal and year dummies are not reported. 
Robust errors clustered at the county level. 
z-values in parenthesis. 
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01.  
 
population-centric contests with social, political and economic dimensions. Insurgent 
organizations will have the ability to generate political support and continue their violent 
campaign as long as states fail in their counterinsurgency efforts to address those social, 
economic and/or political problems and to secure the loyalties of civilians. The Turkish case 
itself is a good example. Turkish security forces dealt a major blow to the PKK through their 
use of extensive military coercion in the 90s and even captured its leader Abdullah Öcalan in 
1999. The PKK then declared a unilateral ceasefire. Many commentators heralded this as the 
PKK’s defeat and as the end of the conflict (Bila, 2000; Cemal, 1999). However, because the 
Turkish governments failed to take the necessary steps to address the political, economic and 
social problems underlying the conflict, the organization easily recovered in the early 2000s 
and violence resumed.  
Finally, results must be tempered by the study’s limitations. First, it must be admitted that, 
rather than absolute numbers, the ratio of casualties to group size in each location at each time 
period provides a better measure of the extent of the damage on the operational capabilities of 
the sides. Not surprisingly though, for strategic purposes, no army or insurgent organization 
reveals such information, hence working with ratios remains as an ideal.  
Second, it must be emphasized that this is a single-case study. While the media coverage 
of ongoing conflicts around the world offers ample anecdotal evidence of the generalizability 





The dataset, codebook, and do-files for the empirical analysis in this article, along with the 
online appendix, can be found at http://www.prio.org/jpr/datasets. All statistical analyses were 
conducted using Stata15. TPCONED is available at the University of Warwick Research 
Archive Portal https://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/138227.   
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A1. The data 
TPCONED (https://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/138227) is a dataset on the fatal events of the armed 
conflict between the rebel organization PKK and the Turkish state that took place on Turkish 
soil and in which there was at least one combatant casualty. It contains detailed information 
on 7063 conflict events with 17308 PKK casualties and 7514 state casualties over the course 
of the conflict in the 1984-2018 period15. For each event, the exact date, location at the county 
(town) level, location at the province level, number of TSF and PKK casualties, and the data 
sources are listed. Table A1 presents some basic descriptive statistics for the numeric 
variables. 
Table A1. Descriptive statistics  
Temporal coverage: 1984 - 2018 
Geographical coverage: Turkey 
Number of observations: 7063 
Variable Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum 
TSF casualties 1.06 2.06 0 66 
PKK casualties 2.45 6.34 0 174 
 
TPCONED relies on a wide range of local sources of information as listed below. The main 
source for each observation is listed under  the variable “mainsource” in the dataset, and the 
complete reference for each source is available on the References page in the TPCONED excel 
file (https://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/138227). 
1- The digital and hard copy archives of five major Turkish daily newspapers, Cumhuriyet, 
Milliyet, Hürriyet, Sabah, and Zaman. The digital archives of Milliyet, Hürriyet, Sabah 
and Zaman were available online on the websites of these newspapers. The online 
archive of Cumhuriyet was accessed through Sabancı University library. The hard copy 
archives were accessed and studied at the Ataturk Library in Istanbul.  
2- A 5-volume publication, named "Our Martyrs" (Şehitlerimiz), published by the Turkish 
Ministry of Defense in late 1998. The publication lists the names, ranks, and place of 
death of all Turkish soldiers that died in combat since 1918. The fifth volume contains 
the list of soldiers who died in the fight against the PKK in the August 1984-September 
                                                        
15 The dataset is continuously updated. Currently, events of 2020 are being coded. 
1998 period. In total, the list contains information on 5554 soldiers. This publication 
actually provides the most credible, and accurate information on Turkish military 
casualties of the period as the information is directly from the personnel records of the 
Turkish General Staff. 
3- Publications by local administrations, especially district governorships, 
commemorating their local security force casualties. Most of these “martyr albums” 
were published in 1998 on the occasion of the 75th anniversary of the Turkish Republic. 
They include information on local security force casualties and on the conflict events 
that claimed their lives. The list of these publications is available on the References page 
in the TPCONED excel file (https://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/138227). 
4- Monthly reports of the Directorate General of Press and Information of Turkish Prime 
Ministry. These reports (Ayın Tarihi) were available online however, the Directorate 
(and hence its website) was abolished with the switch to a presidential regime in Turkey 
in 2017. 
5- Issues of Serxwebun, a PKK publication (Serxwebun.org).  
6- Daily and yearly (1990-2016) Human Rights Reports by the Turkish Human Rights 
Association (tihv.org.tr). 
7- Web searches using the keywords terror, martyr, PKK, armed attack, insurgent, 
insurgency. Some 359 websites were referred. The list is available on the References 
page in the TPCONED excel file (https://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/138227). Most of these 
are websites of local administrations like district governorships, district and town 
municipalities, and village associations with pages commemorating and providing 
information on their local security force casualties. There are also websites by civil 
society organizations that are completely devoted to commemorate casualties. 
8- I have also contacted and worked with the Associations of Families of Martyrs (Şehit 
Aileleri Dernekleri) across Turkey. These associations are very common in Turkey. 
There is one in almost every city. They are civil society organizations founded by 
families of soldiers and police officers who died on duty. The aim is to help each other 
cope with the situation. Some of them are very active, and have their own websites 
containing information on those family members they had lost to the conflict. I 
contacted 28 of these associations and worked with them in verifying the conflict events 
and casualties. 
9- The Kurdish Insurgency Militants database (Tezcür, 2016). This database includes 
biographical information on 9,196 Kurdish militants who died while fighting in the 
ranks of the PKK between 1984 and 2016. 
(available at https://sciences.ucf.edu/politics/kps/kim-dataset/). 
10- The personnel archives of the General Directorate of Security (Turkish police forces). 
The public relations office of the Directorate was kind enough to provide the list of their 
casualties. 
11- I visited the "martyr cemeteries" in Ankara, Istanbul, and Bursa, three major cities in 
Turkey with more than a thousand security force casualties resting in their cemeteries. 
Note that the tombstones contain information on the date and place of death. 
12- The Gendarmerie Museum in Ankara proved to be an invaluable source of information 
with its extensive database on gendarmerie casualties. The museum also hosts an 
impressive monument at  its entrance in the form of a great wall on which names, places 
and dates of deaths of gendarmerie “martyrs” were carved. 
 
A2. Comparison of TPCONED with the UCDP-GED data 
Donnay et al. (2018) proposes using temporal and spatial windows to assess the overlap 
between data sets. In this section I adopt their proposed data set comparison methodology and 
systematically compare TPCONED with the UCDP-GED data on the Turkish-Kurdish conflict 
for the 1984-2018 period. I used a 10-day temporal window and considered adjacent (border 
sharing) counties as my spatial window. Table A2 summarizes how TPCONED compares to 
the UCDP-GED dataset.  
Table A2. Comparison with the UCDP-GED data TPCONED UCDP-GED dataset 
Number of observations 7063 4682 
Time span 1984-2018 1989-2018 
Spacial unit precision County level for all observations Only 20.6% of observations have exact location 
(a known point like a village, county or city); 
17% have a location within a 25 km radius 
around a known point; 17.5 % have a reference 
to a second order administrative division; 40% 
of observations have only a provincial 
reference; remaining 5.3%  have spatial 
references to large and fuzzy regions or to the 
whole country. 
Time unit precision Exact date (dd/mm/yy) for all observations. 88% of observations have exact date 
(dd/mm/yy). For the remaining 12%, the date is 
only known within a number of days ranging 
from 2 to  180. 
Overlapping observations within a 10-day 
temporal, and neighboring (border sharing) 




Unmatched observations 3583 1202 
Nonmatches with explanation  
 
287 
(the 1984-1988 period which is not covered 





Explanations for the 1202 unmatched GED observations: 
a. 685 of the 1202 unmatched GED observations (57%) have very broad and imprecise (4 
or above in GED time and place precision coding) spatial and/or temporal references. It 
is thus impossible to match them with reasonable accuracy with my data. 
b. 92 of the remaining 517 unmatched GED observations do not have any province or 
county listed even though their location precision coding indicates relatively precise  
location (4 or less in GED coding).  
c. 42 of the remaining 425 unmatched GED observations refer to a location outside Turkey 
(Syria, Iraq or Iran). 
d.  87 of the remaining 383 unmatched GED observations refer to events with no 
combatant casualties. TPCONED only includes events with combatant casualties.  
e. 4 of the 296 unmatched GED observations refer to clashes between the PKK and 
paramilitaries. My data set only includes encounters with the state forces and the PKK. 
I deliberately left out encounters between paramilitaries and the PKK from my data set 
because paramilitaries (they are called village guards in Turkey) are in fact civilians and 
their identities are of course not public. As such it is very difficult if not impossible to 
distinguish between civilian casualties and paramilitary casualties. And not 
surprisingly, it has not been uncommon for both the PKK and the Turkish state to 
proclaim civilian killings as paramilitary deaths. So, there is significant uncertainty 
surrounding such events. 
f. 12 of the 292 unmatched GED observations refer to terrorist attacks by other armed 
organizations like DEV-SOL or DHKPC. So, they are not part of the armed conflict 
between the Turkish state and the PKK. 
g. 12 of the 280 unmatched GED observations are double entries, i.e. they are either 
duplicates or parts of other matched GED observations. 
h.  4 of the 268 unmatched GED observations refer to killings of public servants (like 
prosecutors or teachers who in fact are civilians) by the PKK. 
i. 5 of the 264 unmatched GED observations refer to a location (village) that does not 
exist. 
j. 18 of the remaining 259 unmatched GED observations refer to a mountain or a river as 
location even though their location precision coding is less than 4. Thus, it is not 
possible to decipher the county information for these observations. 
k. Of the remaining 241 unmatched GED observations 117 have no “original source” 
listed. 105 observations have only the Turkish authorities  (Turkish state news agency, 
security forces, general staff, governors, etc.) listed as their original source, 7 of them 
list Turkish media sources as their original source of information. Only 12 observations 
list Kurdish media or PKK sources as their original source. Not surprisingly, while most 
of these events involve PKK casualties (as high as 76 casualties in some of them), 
Turkish security forces are reported to incur casualties in only  33 of them which 
indicates that there might be a source bias concerning these observations. Moreover, it 
is not possible to confirm any of those 33 events via the identity of TSF casualties 
because no such casualties at those dates and locations are listed or mentioned in any of 
the official and media resources that TPCONED refers to.   
 
A3. Model identification 
The biprobit model employed in this study is mathematically equivalent to a bivariate probit 
model with partial observability. This implies that identification requires  a restriction that 
affects only one of the equations (Xiang, 2010; Poirier, 1980). In his model of interstate conflict 
Xiang (2010) argues that  the control variables that are uncommon in the two equations serve 
as identification restrictions (p. 491). I have a similar but a much stronger argument for 
identification in my model. Note that the base risk equation (Z vector of covariates) includes 
a rich set of controls which depict the socioeconomic and political situation at the start of the 
armed conflict, and these (cross sectional) controls are unique to the base risk equation. These 
variables are all measurements taken at early 1980s, and thus, are geared towards taking the 
socioeconomic picture of the country (at the county level) right around the start of the armed 
conflict in order to understand the conditions that render certain areas ripe for the conflict. 
In contrast, the diffusion equation is mainly composed of within conflict dynamics, aimed at 
understanding those factors that facilitate geotemporal spillovers, and accordingly, the 
measurements for these panel variables all belong to the period after the start of the armed 
conflict. And similarly, these controls are unique to the diffusion equation. In total, the model 
includes some 55 control variables and only 2 of them (percentage of mountainous terrain in 
rural area, and border status) are common to both equations. The remaining 53 control 
variables, with 11 of them uniquely in the base risk equation and cross-sectionally measured 
right around the start of the conflict in 1984, and 42 of them uniquely in the diffusion equation 
with panel measurements belonging to the period after the start of the conflict, create the 
necessary restriction for identification.  
 
A4. Socioeconomic controls and the base risk of conflict 
The vector of covariates for base risk in my split population bi-probit model includes a rich set 
of controls which depict the socioeconomic situation at the start of the armed conflict. The 
data comes from a “village inventory” study conducted in 1981 by the Turkish Ministry of 
Agriculture and Rural Affairs, and the general census of 1985 which coincides roughly with the 
start of the armed conflict in August 1984. I control for percentage of mountainous rural area; 
percentage of farmers with no land; percentage of farmers with more than 100 acres of land; 
number of mosques per village; percentage of villages with no drinking water; percentage of 
villages with no electricity; and percentage of villages whose names were changed by the 
Turkish state; the unemployment and literacy rate, border status, Kurdish population 
percentages, and urbanization and population across counties.  
Land ownership is both an indicator of wealth and an indicator of political participation in 
rural areas. The Turkish state has a long tradition of using big land owners as its agents in the 
periphery. Since the foundation of the Republic, large landowners have been co-opted in 
politics by political parties (Tachau, 1973). The political dominance of agas (large landowners) 
within the Parliament and local party structures have been frequently noted by scholars of 
Turkish politics (Kudat, 1975; Meeker, 1972). Hence, I expect the state to establish better 
control and authority over rural areas where big land owners reside and thereby to reduce 
any political and military opportunity for organizing an insurgency (Holtermann, 2012). 
On the other hand, landless peasants can also be an important determinant of the 
underlying risk distribution as their presence is associated with economic grievances which  
create a more fertile recruitment ground for the insurgency (Holtermann, 2012).   
I also control for the number of mosques per village as mosques in Turkey have always 
been instrumental in establishing state control and disseminating state ideology over 
populations. In the context of the Turkish-Kurdish conflict, religious institutions have been 
used by the state to promote an encompassing Muslim identity over ethnic ones. Note that 
all imams in Turkey are public employees appointed from the center by the state. Not only 
that, their sermons are also prepared at and sent from the Directorate of Religious Affairs.  
The percentage of villages with no water and electricity are included to control for the 
infrastructure and services provided by the state. 
Another control I include is the percentage of villages whose names were changed by the 
state. The Turkish state had replaced the official names of a great deal of administrative units 
which originally had names in the native languages of local inhabitants from different ethnic 
groups, with new Turkish names as part of a Turkification strategy. I use the percentage of 
such villages across geographical units as a proxy for the intensity of ethnic discriminatory 
state policies. Ethnic discrimination is identified as an important factor that increases the 
vulnerability of a country to experience conflict (Metternich, Minhas & Ward, 2017; Cederman 
et al., 2013; Cederman, Wimmer & Min, 2010). I make a similar argument for within country 
distribution of conflict risk. 
Apart from the controls I derive from the 1981 village inventory study, I also control for 
the unemployment and literacy rate, border status, Kurdish population percentages, and 
urbanization and population across locations. The data for these controls comes from the 
1985 census except for the Kurdish population percentages which is an estimate I calculated 
based on prior scholarly work on the ethnic distribution of population in Turkey (Mutlu, 1996).  
Unemployment and literacy rates are indicators of economic development and welfare. I 
expect unemployment rate to be positively associated with the base risk of conflict since it is 
an indicator of economic grievances and the opportunity costs of joining a rebellion. Literacy 
rates can cut both ways. On one hand, illiterate populations are expected to be more 
religiously conservative, less politically aware, and less sensitive to social issues. On the other 
hand, one can expect opportunity costs of joining a rebellion to be lower for less educated 
people. 
I expect the distribution of ethnically Kurdish populations to be one of the most important 
determinants of base risk of conflict since the PKK is an ethnic insurgency founded with the 
goal of establishing a Kurdish state. Naturally, those areas inhabited by ethnically Kurdish 
populations are expected to make up the targeted “ethnic homeland”. Relatedly, ethnically 
Kurdish populations constitute the main support base for the insurgency.  
Border locations are also more likely to be targeted by insurgencies especially in cases 
where ethnic kins live on both sides of the border (Cederman, Girardin & Gleditsch, 2009; 
Cederman et al., 2013), or neighbours are sympathetic to the insurgents for various reasons 
(Salehyan & Gleditsch, 2007). In the Turkish case, neighbouring countries like Syria and Iraq 
host large Kurdish populations. Moreover, these countries have weak states with limited 
ability to control their territories and borders.  
I expect urban areas to carry less risk since insurgencies mostly target rural areas with 
limited state reach. I also control for population as more populous locations are expected to 
have a higher risk of conflict (Weidman & Ward, 2010). 
Finally, I control for the percentage of mountainous rural areas. There exists ample 
empirical evidence that difficult terrains provide fertile grounds for civil conflicts (Fearon & 
Laitin, 2003; Do & Iyer, 2010; Weidman & Ward, 2010; Zhukov, 2012; Holtermann, 2016). 
Table A3 presents the descriptive statistics for the socioeconomic controls included in the 
analyses. 






County area in km squares 1025.9 704.1 [11-6585] 
Percentage of mountainous terrain in rural area 50.4 27.2 [0-100] 
Border status  0.07 0.26 [0-1] 
Percentage of villages whose names were changed by the state 32.7 30.7 [0-100] 
Percentage of landless farmers 27.4 14.4 [0-76] 
Percentage of farmers with more than 100 acres of land 10.1 12.7 [0-77] 
Number of mosques per village 0.96 0.44 [0-4.3] 
Percentage of villages with no drinking water 12.9 13.8 [0-87] 
Percentage of villages with no electricity 46.3 36.1 [0-100] 
Percentage of ethnically Kurdish population 16.2 24.5 [0.1- 85] 
Urbanization rate 32.7 19.4 [6-100] 
Literacy rate 71.8 12.5 [29-93] 
Unemployment rate 3.5 2.6 [0.2-20] 
Population in 10 thousand 6.9 9.6 [0.4-100] 
 
Figure A1 plots the base risk across counties predicted by these variables along with the actual 
distribution of total combatant casualties. As the two maps reveal, the model accurately 




Figure A1. Comparison of the estimated base risk with the actual distribution of combatant casualties 
 
Table A4 reports the estimated average marginal effects from the main split population 
biprobit model in order to give a better understanding of the relative substantive significance 
of the estimates parameters. 
 




























Inverse-distance-weighted state casualties in other 









Inverse-distance-weighted insurgent casualties in 

















































Percentage of villages whose names were changed by 
the state 
0.00003*  
(2.24)                        
0.00004*   
(2.34)                        
0.0002*   
(2.32)                        
0.0002*   
(2.17)                        
Percentage of landless farmers 0.00006*  
(2.26)   
0.00004   
(1.46)   
0.0003**   
(3.02)   
0.0004**   
(3.26)   
Percentage of farmers with more than 100 acres of 
land 
-0.001*  
(2.42)   
-0.0001*   
(3.15)   
-0.0004*   
(3.00)   
-0.0006*   
(3.25)   
Number of mosques per village -0.003*   
(2.41)   
-0.001†   
(1.66)   
-0.011**   
(3.03)   
-0.013**   
(2.94)   
Percentage of villages with no drinking water 0.00002   
(1.01)   
-0.00001   
(-0.71)   
0.0001   
(-0.98)   
0.0001   
(1.30)   
Percentage of villages with no electricity 0.00002†   
(1.69)   
0.00002   
(1.47)   
0.0001*   
(2.50)   
0.0002*   
(2.21)   
Percentage of ethnically Kurdish population 0.0001**  
(5.05)   
0.0004**   
(5.86)   
0.0003**   
(3.93)   
0.0006**   
(4.26)   
Urbanization rate -0.00004 
(1.09)   
-0.00002 
(0.56)   
-0.0002 
(1.47)   
-0.0001 
(0.64)   
Literacy rate 0.00004   
(0.83)   
-0.00007   
(1.01)   
0.0002   
(1.17)   
0.0002   
(0.93)   
Unemployment rate 0.0005*   
(1.97)   
0.0005*   
(2.20)   
0.002*   
(2.25)   
0.002*   
(1.97)   
Population in 10 thousand 0.00008†   
(1.67)   
0.00006**   
(2.81)   
0.0006*   
(1.98)   
0.0007**  
(3.44)   
Estimated parameters for seasonal and year dummies are not reported. 
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01.  
z-values in parenthesis. 
 
A5. Results from a logit model 
Table A5 presents the estimated odds ratios under a simple logit model with clustered errors 
at the county level. The model includes the same controls as the main biprobit model. 
 
TABLE A5. Logit results, odds ratios 
 
 
Unit of observation: 
County-month 
(1984-2018) 
Number of obs.: 
266845 
Unit of observation: 
County-quarter year 
(1984-2018) 
Number of obs.: 
88734 
Unit of observation: 
County-half year 
(1984-2018) 
Number of obs.: 
44367 
Unit of observation: 
County-year 
(1984-2018) 
Number of obs.: 
21862 
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Inverse-distance-weighted insurgent casualties 

















































Percentage of villages whose names were 



























































































Estimated parameters for seasonal and year dummies are not reported. 
Standard errors are clustered at the county level. 
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01.  
z-values in parenthesis. 
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